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The online museum was created with the support of the Sharaf Rashidov International Foundation.

Sharaf Rashidov — an outstanding statesman, a famous writer who led the republic in extremely difficult years

The online museum was created with the support of the Sharaf Rashidov International Foundation.

Sharaf Rashidov — an outstanding statesman, a famous writer who led the republic in extremely difficult years

POLITICIAN AND DIPLOMAT (1965 - 1970)

POLITICIAN AND DIPLOMAT (1965 - 1970). ECONOMY OF UZBEKISTAN (AGRICULTURE)

IN 1965, UZBEKISTAN COLLECTED 3,903,000 TONNES OF "WHITE GOLD", THE FOLLOWING YEAR BY 180,000 TONNES MORE, IN 1967 THERE WAS ALMOST NO INCREASE, AND IN 1968 THE PRODUCTION EVEN DROPPED A LITTLE TO 4,000,010 TONNES.
Naturally, Moscow was dissatisfied with these figures. Rashidov had to seek advice from agricultural specialists, and they proposed chemicalisation as the fastest way to success. Butifos was selected as most appropriate. This guaranteed the growth of cotton and savings of millions of roubles.
Later, Rashidov's critics would reproach him for this ‘chemicalisation’, accusing him of soil exhaustion and contamination. However, Rashidov had no other way to increase the yield of cotton for several years. The central government and those of other cotton-growing republics urged him to increase production as soon as possible. The Brezhnev team that came to power in Moscow needed quick results that would strengthen its political positions. Brezhnev ordered the construction of a plant to chemically produce defoliants in Volgograd. Since the increase in cotton yields required the expansion of acreage and additional water resources, the problem of where to get this water arose. That was when the century-old idea about taking it from northern rivers was revived.

Khrushchev's removal postponed the implementation of this project for a while, and only in 1968 they returned to it again. Uzbekistan would have benefited the most from this plan, but the project also had a lot of opponents from various ministries in the Soviet republics and the USSR government. The project was most disadvantageous for Kazakhstan since water was going to be taken from the Irtysh, the largest river in this republic.

MEANWHILE, DEMANDING THAT THE COTTON-GROWING REPUBLICS SHOULD INCREASE THE YIELDS OF "WHITE GOLD", THE CENTRE BOUGHT IT AT LOWER PRICES. THE PURCHASE PRICE FOR UZBEK COTTON IN THE LAST YEARS WAS, ON AVERAGE, FIVE TIMES LOWER THAN WORLD PRICES IF COUNTED ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIALLY PUBLISHED COMMERCIAL EXCHANGE RATE.
The cotton was deliberately under-priced, and the very cotton price did not include either the full cost of labour or the full cost of consumed natural resources. Supposedly, the central government purposefully maintained the low purchase prices for cotton. It could thus make the authorities of the cotton-growing republics, concerned about the arrival of financial resources they needed, maintain the cotton yield at a high level.